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Trends In Own Recognizance Release:
From Manhattan To California
The bail system in the United States has long been criticized
as unfair to those having limited financial resources and irrelevant
as to the central question of which defendants should be able to
secure pretrial release. Own recognizance release projects have
received considerable attention in recent years, and the viability
of an OR program as an alternative to the bail system provides
the theme for this comment. The author analyzes nonappearance
and recidivism rates for various bailed and OR control groups and
examines the cost implications of both systems. Consideration of
a rather startling New York study concerning the effects of pre-
trial detention on final case disposition, along with the applicable
California statutory OR provisions leads to the inevitable conclusion
that OR is as successful as bail in guaranteeing appearance in
court while at the same time providing a greater measure of fair-
ness to all defendants. The author offers legislation which would
implement a state-wide OR project and furnish a palliative for
the inequities in the present system.
If it is true that "the quality of a nation's civilization can be largely
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal
law," then the American bail system . . can no longer be tol-
erated. At best, it is a system of checkbook justice; at worst, a
highly commercialized racket.1
This sentiment, expressed nearly ten years ago by former Justice
Goldberg, reflected the view widely held by members of the criminal
justice system that the monetary bail system was no longer in step
with the needs of our modem and largely urban society. As an out-
growth of this concern, the last decade has witnessed a flurry of activity
in bail reform on both the state2 and federal' levels. This comment
1. R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM ix (1965) [hereinafter cited as RANsoM].
2. Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. ITL. L.
FoRUm 35.
3. 18 U.S.C. §3146 (1966); Wald & Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A
Practitioner's Primer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940 (1966); NATONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND
CmMNAL JUSTICE, BAIL AND SUMMONS: 1965; NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT (1965).
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will focus upon one aspect of these reform efforts-the release of
criminal defendants on their own recognizance (hereinafter referred
to as "OR"). Therefore, it is important to examine the nation's pilot
OR release project and determine whether the trends established therein
are reflected in the results reported by the California OR projects. Next,
the ramifications of a recent study conducted by the Legal Aid Society
of New York City relating to the impact of pretrial detention upon
case disposition for bailed and detained defendants will be explored.
Finally, an examination will be made of existing statutory authority
for OR release in California, followed by suggestions for future legisla-
tion.
THE MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT
In 1960 a chemical engineer and industrialist named Louis Schweit-
zer toured the detention facilities at a Brooklyn jail. He was shocked
not only by the poor conditions within the facility, but by the fact that
many defendants were being detained prior to trial for periods of up
to a year simply because they could not afford bail.4 Schweitzer
learned that of the 114,653 persons detained pending trial in New
York City jails during 1960, only 30,827 were subsequently convicted
and given jail sentences. The remainder served time merely due to
their inability to post bail.5 These facts prompted Schweitzer to ex-
periment with what he considered the "basic. . flaw in the bail sys-
tem, that reliance upon money is a valid criterion for pretrial release."0
In 1961 Schweitzer established the Vera Foundation, a charitable
organization which, among other things, sought to aid indigents ac-
cused of crime. Its first undertaking, the Manhattan Bail Project, re-
ceived cooperation from the courts and the New York City Department
of Corrections. The project consisted of a factfinding unit composed
of law students who investigated certain defendants to determine
whether there were factors in their backgrounds to indicate a strong
likelihood that they would honor a promise to appear in court.7 The
students conducted interviews of newly arrested felony defendants and
investigated four key areas-residential stability, employment history,
family contacts within the city, and prior criminal record-to determine
whether a defendant qualified as a good risk. Each defendant's re-
sponse was categorized and evaluated upon a point system. If the
defendant achieved the minimum point total required, then, with
4. RANSOM at 150-51.
5. Id. at 151.
6. Id. at 151-52.
7. Those defendants charged with homicide, narcotics, or sex offenses were elim-
inated from consideration. Id. at 154.
1974 / Trends In Own Recognizance Release
his consent, the student would verify the information. Following veri-
fication, a summary of the information concerning a qualified defend-
ant, together with a recommendation for release, was submitted to the
court at arraignment. Armed with this information, the court could
make an intelligent determination as to whether the defendant quali-
fied for OR and, if not, in what amount bail should be set.'
One major criticism of the bail-setting process has been that judges
are forced to make crucial decisions relating to a defendant's pretrial
liberty based upon minimal information and with little time for adequate
consideration." Judges may be aware of only the charge against the de-
fendant and his past record. According to the Report of the United
States Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice, this information is inadequate and often oper-
ates to the detriment of the accused.10 This was the deficiency Mr.
Schweitzer set about to correct. By providing the court with relevant
information regarding the defendant's community ties, the project re-
port enabled the court to individualize the bail-setting process.
Apart from the human costs of pretrial detention l and its impact
upon the disposition of one's case, 2 the success or failure of a given
OR project is largely measured by the recidivism'3 and appearance
rates among the defendants it recommends for release. These rates
are compared with those of bail releasees for the same area. If the
OR rates are the same or lower, this indicates a measure of success.
The early findings of the Manhattan Bail Project indicated some
interesting trends in these key areas. From October 1961 through
September 1962, the project kept records of two control groups-those
released on bail and those released on OR as a result of the recom-
mendations made by the project.' 4  Of the 1,395 defendants released
on bail, 101 failed to appear-a default rate of 7.2 percent. In con-
trast, only three of the 250 defendants released on OR failed to appear-
8. See D. FREin & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNrrm) STATEs: 1964 at 59-62;
Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United States, 66 COLuM. L. RaV. 109, 116 (1966).
9. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 10, 53, Bellamy v. Judges of New York City and
County (N.Y.S. Ct., App. Div., 1st Dep't, March 1972) [hereinafter cited as Plain-
tiffs Memorandum].
10. Proceedings of the Conference on Bail and Indigency, 1965 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 1, 10.
11. RANSOM at 32, 41.
12. See text accompanying notes 78-98 infra.
13. The term "recidivism" refers to criminals who, having been convicted of one
crime, subsequently commit others. It is technically incorrect to refer to defendants
who commit crimes while released on bail or OR as recidivists, for at this stage in the
proceedings their guilt as to the original charge has yet to be determined. However,
to be consistent with terminology used by the various OR projects, "recidivism" will
be used in this comment.
14. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on
the Use of Pre-trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 67, 86 (1963).
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a rate of 1.2 percent. Moreover, only two defendants from the OR
group were rearrested on new charges-a recidivism rate of 0.8 per-
cent.15 Unfortunately, comparable statistics were not kept as to the
number of bail releasees arrested on new charges.
The figures relating to appearance rates were reaffirmed by the
project's three-year -action phase 6 which reported its findings through
1964. During that period, 3,505 persons were released on OR and
only 56, or 1.6 percent, failed to appear in court. The forfeiture rate
for bail releasees, at 3 percent, was nearly double. These findings
seemed to confirm Mr. Schweitzer's original hypothesis that "verified
information about the defendant's roots in the community is a more
reliable criterion upon which to base release than ability to buy a bail
bond."'')
Another important factor is the impact of an OR project upon jail
operating expenses. If OR can facilitate the release of good risk de-
fendants who perform as well as bailed defendants and, in addition,
save tax revenue, then OR is more than accomplishing its purpose.18
Figures from New York City revealed that during 1962 it cost the
public $6.25 to keep one person in jail for one day. In one year over
58,000 defendants each spent an average of 30 days in pretrial deten-
tion, nearly two million jail days, resulting in a cost to the taxpayer
of over ten million dollars.'9 Studies conducted elsewhere have re-
ported similar findings.20 The Constitutional Rights Subcommittee
of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee revealed that the
federal government was, at the time of the report, spending four mil-
lion dollars a year to house defendants in federal detention facilities.
An additional two million dollars was being expended annually to
cover custody costs for federal prisoners held in local jail facilities.2'
According to one authority, the maintenance cost of pretrial detention
facilities is a "staggering waste of millions of dollars a year . . .
[which] yields no compensating profit."22  The magnitude of these
expenditures is brought into focus by considering the large number of
defendants unable to afford bail.2 3  One early study of felony cases
in New York revealed that of 2,292 criminal cases where bail was set,
15. Id.
16. Conference on Bail, supra note 10, at 42.
17. Id.
18. Interview with Clarence E. Williams, Consultant, Assembly Committee on
Ways and Means, California State Legislature, Sacramento, Calif., Oct. 30, 1973.
19. Conference on Bail, supra note 10, at 11; Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ulti-
mate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 634 (1964).
20. RANsoM at 37.
21. Id. at 44.
22. Id. at 32.
23. OFFicn OF EcONOMC OPPoRTuNniy, THE PuTAL RELPASE PROGRAM 2
(1973).
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51 percent of the defendants could not afford it.24 Although this per-
centage varies from place to place, random samplings of the number
of defendants unable to make bail are illustrative: St. Louis, 79 per-
cent; Baltimore, 75 percent; Miami, 71 percent; San Francisco, 57
percent; and Boston, 54 percent. 25 The obvious conclusion is that
government expenditures can be significantly reduced if "good risk"
defendants are released on OR pending trial rather than required to
languish in jail at the taxpayer's expense.
OR RELEASE IN CALIFORN1-
Following the lead of the Manhattan Bail Project, other states began
to experiment with OR as an alternative to bail. 26 California has been
in the forefront of this movement, and within the last decade OR pro-
jects have emerged in many counties of the state.2 7 Although it is
beyond the scope of this comment to consider how these projects differ
procedurally from the Manhattan experiment, it suffices to say that
many operate on some variation of the point system, and nearly all
look for the same background characteristics which the Manhattan
Project demonstrated as valid criteria for release.
This survey will concentrate upon the most current data available
to determine whether the trends established by the Manhattan Project
are consistent with the California experience. Again, the emphasis will
be upon key factors such as recidivism and appearance rates, as well
as cost benefits. At the outset, it is important to note that there are
no uniform record-keeping procedures practiced by California's many
OR units.28  This is largely due to the recent nature and experimental
quality of many of the projects. Any comparisons among the reported
results will require consideration of this factor, and the differences,
when significant, will be indicated.
A. Recidivism Rates
One reason that OR is psychologically unpopular29 is the belief that
defendants released pending trial pose a threat to community safety
24. RANSOM at 39.
25. Conference on Bail, supra note 10, at 10.
26. D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 8, at 56-57.
27. Due to the recent nature of many projects and the lack of reportable data,
this survey will be limited to the following projects: San Francisco OR Project, Santa
Clara Pre-trial Release Program, Matin County Pre-trial Release Program, Los Angeles
County OR Program, San Mateo County OR Project, Tulare County Honor Release
Program, Alameda County Pre-trial Release Unit, San Diego County Probation Depart-
ment Bail Project, San Bernardino County OR Project, and the Berkeley OR Project.
28. Interview with Susan J. Bookman, Project Director, Berkeley OR Project,
Berkeley, Calif., June 29, 1973.
29. Interview with Kenneth C. L. Babb, Director, San Francisco Bail Project, San
Francisco, Calif., July 12, 1973.
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in that they are likely to commit new offenses.30 This view is largely
premised upon the belief that the defendants are already guilty of one
crime. Of course, this rationale is the antithesis of a criminal justice
system based upon the presumption of innocence. As a corollary, ad-
herents to this view assume that bailed defendants -are less likely to
commit new offenses pending trial than are those released free of
charge. The belief is that bail somehow serves as a deterrent to
crime. Despite severe criticism,31 this somewhat illogical view has
gained widespread acceptance. Thus it is important to consider
whether recidivism rates differ between defendants released on bail
and those released on OR.
The Santa Clara Pre-trial Release Project is the only California unit
known to have systematically examined recidivism rates between both
types of releasees. 2 To establish a credible comparison the project
studied the conduct of two control groups-those released on bail from
August 1971 through December 1971 and those released on OR dur-
ing the same period. Each group was composed solely of males. To
alleviate the charge that the OR group included only "good risk" de-
fendants while the bail group included "bad risks" not qualified for
OR, the project evaluated only those bailed defendants who had been
processed through the OR interview and had received the required
point total to qualify for release yet decided to post bail.
Records of the county sheriff were examined by the project to deter-
mine if any new offenses were committed by defendants in either
group prior to the disposition of the original charge.83 From the 342
in the OR sample group, 178 had originally been charged with misde-
meanors and 164 with felonies. However, in only 19 cases were new
offenses reported-a recidivism rate of 5.6 percent. Of the 199 de-
fendants in the bail group, including 95 charged with misdemeanors
and 104 with felonies, 13 new offenses were reported-a recidivism
rate of 6.5 percent.
These findings suggest that the "risk of someone being arrested in
the same county for [a] new [offense] is low for both the OR and
bail groups and that, statistically, there is no significant difference be-
tween them. . . .,z In point of fact, the OR group performed better
than the bail group. These results led the administrators of the pro-
30. Tun SAN FRANCISCO COMmIrrEF ON CRIME, BAnL AND O.R. RELEASE 42(1971) [hereinafter cited as BAIL AND O.R. RELEASE].
31. RANSOM at 3-4.
32. Santa Clara Pre-trial Release Project, Final First-Year Evaluation Report,
at 18-22 (June 1, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Santa Clara Report].
33. New offense was defined as any new booking. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 21.
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ject to conclude that "compared to bail, there is no significant increase
in [the] . . . risk of recidivism for individuals released [on] OR."' 5
It should be noted that most project directors were unable to main-
tain recidivism records for OR defendants due to limitations of time
and money.36 A few directors were unwilling to estimate what the
recidivism rate was for their releasees, while others believed the num-
ber to be insignificant. One stated that the "rate was relatively low
and confined mainly to alcoholics. '37  As for bailed defendants, recid-
ivism statistics are not kept by most OR projects due to the same lim-
itations. Furthermore, neither bondsmen 8 nor the Bureau of Crim-
inal Statistics compile such data. Clearly, more research is required
to establish reliable patterns of conduct for defendants released on OR.
However, if the results from Santa Clara are -any indication, the aver-
sion many have to OR release may be unfounded.
B. Appearance Rates
Despite the widely held view that bail acts as a deterrent to future
crime, the only legitimate purpose of bail is to insure that the accused
will appear in court when required. 9 It has been held to be an abuse
of discretion for a court to manipulate the bail-setting process to pre-
vent a defendant's release for the purpose of protecting the public.
40
The theory of bail is that flight from the jurisdiction is deterred either
by the threat of financial loss or by visions of a vigilant bondsman
authorized to return to court a fleeing defendant for whom he has
acted as surety.41 However, the early findings of the Manhattan Pro-
35. Id. at 22.
36. The Berkeley OR Project was the only other unit which reported recidivism
statistics. That data was confined to OR releasees and showed a rate of 8 percent.
However, the Berkeley project does not make formal recommendations to the court as
to which defendants it feels should be released as good risks. All cases are presented,
and information, whether verified or not, is given to the court. The judge then decides
whether to grant OR. Conceivably, the recidivism rate would be lower if the project
made recommendations for release since many of the bad risks would be screened and
excluded. Berkeley OR Project Statistics as of May 1, 1971.
37. Interview with Donald Olson, Director of Adult Services, Marin County Pro-
bation Dep't, San Rafael, Calif., July 3, 1973.
38. Interview with William F. Sandbach, Executive Director, California Advisory
Board of Surety Agents, Sacramento, Calif., Dec. 17, 1973.
39. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 348, 508 P.2d 721, 723, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401,
403 (1973).
40. The court in Undervood stated, "The purpose of bail is to assure the defen-
dant's attendance in court when his presence is required, whether before or after convic-
tion. Bail is not a means for punishing defendants nor for protecting the public
safety." Id.
41. CAL. PEN. CODE §1305 authorizes bondsmen to return a fleeing defendant for
whom they have acted as surety. The performance of bondsmen in this regard has
been questioned in a Los Angeles study. See ExzctrrrvE CoMMrITEE oF TrH SuPERIOR
CouRT or Los ANGELES CouNTY, BAIL STUDY addendum 15 (1973); but see also Calif.
Advisory Board of Surety Agents, A Study of the Disposition of Bail Forfeitures (May
1973).
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ject suggest that defendants released on OR appear in court at a higher
rate than their bailed counterparts. Since this is a critical factor in
measuring the progress of any OR project,42 nearly all projects sur-
veyed have kept records on this problem.43
The most thorough information was reported by the San Francisco
OR Project, the Santa Clara Pre-trial Release Project, and the Matin
County Pre-trial Release Program. All three reported statistics for de-
fendants released on bail and OR. In San Francisco, the Committee
on Crime conducted a statistical survey of the failure-to-appear rates
for felony defendants released prior to trial during 1969."1 Of 1,843
persons released on OR, only 42 failed to appear-a nonappearance
rate of 2.3 percent. However, of 1,052 defendants released on
bail, 57 failed to appear-a forfeiture rate of 5.4 percent. The
committee noted that these figures understated the success of OR since
a bail forfeiture, as defined by statute, and a failure to appear, as tabu-
lated by the project, are not the same. When a defendant on OR
fails to appear, the staff allows itself just 60 days to return him to
court before he is considered in default. In contrast, California Penal
Code Section 1305 allows a bailed defendant 180 days to return before
forfeiture." Therefore, the 1969 figures, which downplay the suc-
cess of the project, led the committee to suggest that OR was "at
least twice as successful as the money bail system in insuring ...
appearances in court . . .,,"
The Santa Clara Pre-trial Release Project used the same screening
procedure in comparing the appearance rates for defendants released
on bail and OR as it had for determining recidivism rates for both
groups. Again, the purpose was to make sure that the composition
of each was similar.4 7 During the period from August 1971 to Decem-
ber 1971, 1,780 males charged with misdemeanors 'and 328 charged
with felonies were released on their own recognizance. A total of
137 failed to appear-a rate of 6.5 percent 48  For the 195 males
released on bail during the same period, only 10 failed to appear-
a rate of 5.1 percent.4  Although the default rate for bail releasees
was lower, it did not differ significantly from that of defendants on
42. OFFicE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNrrY, supra note 23, at 20.
43. The Contra Costa and Solano County Pretrial Release Projects were unable
to report any figures since both projects had been in operation only a short time.
44. The Committee concluded that the project had been successful in over 96 per-
cent of all cases handled. BAIL AND O.R. RELEASB at 19-22.
45. BAIL AND O.R. RELEASE at 21-22.
46. Id. at 22.
47. Santa Clara Report at 18.
48. A failure to appear was defined as any nonappearance irrespective of the rea-
son or whether the defendant subsequently reappeared on his own. Id. at 19.
49. Id. at 20.
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OR. Thus the Santa Clara report concluded that "releasing individuals
on their Own Recognizance does not significantly increase the risk
of failure to appear. . . compared with persons qualified for OR who
were released on bail." 0
Similarly, the Marin County Project reported that for the twelve-
month period between September 1971 and August 1972, a monthly
average of 206 persons were released on OR, of whom 205 appeared
as requested-a failure-to-appear rate of less than 1 percent. By com-
parison, a monthly average of 45 persons were released on bail, of
whom an average of 43 appeared in court-a forfeiture rate of 4.4
percent. Again, there was little disparity between the two groups.51
The remaining projects surveyed did not keep comparative figures
for both bailed and OR defendants, but concentrated instead upon the
latter. Thus it is difficult to evaluate whether the reported nonappear-
ance rates are high or low in relation to bail forfeitures. However,
for comparative purposes, the state-wide forfeiture average for bail re-
leasees is between 4 and 5 percent.5 2
The Los Angeles County OR Program reports that of the 12,717
felony defendants released on OR from January 1965 through Decem-
ber 1972, 894, or 7 percent, failed to appear.53 Although comparative
statistics were not compiled, the Executive Officer of the Los Angeles
County Superior Court stated that the "non-appearance percentage [of
defendants released on OR] is generally accepted as being as good or
better than the . . . percentage of defendants who are released on
bond.' '54  The San Mateo County OR Project reports that from De-
cember 1968 to December 1971, 1,741 defendants were released on
OR. Of these, 116 failed to appear-a rate of 6.6 percent.55
Reports from Tulare, Alameda, San Diego, and San Bernardino
counties, as well as the city of Berkeley, demonstrate failure-to-appear
rates lower than those of either Los Angeles or San Mateo counties. The
50. Id.
51. Letter from Donald Olsen, Director of Adult Services, Manin County Proba-
tion Dep't, San Rafael, Calif., to the Pacific Law Journal, July 9, 1973.
52. Memorandum from William F. Sandbach, Executive Director, Bail Agents and
Surety Agents Association, to Members of Joint Law and Legislative Committees, Cali-
fornia Peace Officers' Association and District Attorneys' Association, Jan. 18, 1973,
on file in the offices of the Pacific Law Journal.
53. L.A. Co. Superior Court OR Div., OR Statistics-End of Year Report 1972
[hereinafter cited as Superior Court Report]. The report covers the years from 1965
through 1972 inclusive and lists cumulative figures for some areas.
54 Frank S. Zolin, Executive Officer, Los Angeles County Superior Court, Press
Release, Los Angeles, Calif., July 12, 1972.
55. San Mateo County OR Project, Statistical Report, Dec. 1968-Dec. 1971. The
project indicates that not all should be counted as failures to appear, since some had
legitimate excuses for nonappearance and others voluntarily returned to court after the
issuance of a bench warrant.
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Tulare County Honor Release Program reports a nonappearance rate
of 2.7 percent,56 while both the Alameda County Pre-trial Release
Unit and the San Diego County Probation Department Bail Project
indicate rates of 3.5 percent.57  The rates for both the San Bernardino
County OR Project and the Berkeley OR Project were even lower,
at 1.7 percent and 3 percent, respectively."a In short, the above fig-
ures appear to confirm the original hypothesis of the Manhattan Pro-
ject that community ties can be reliable criteria for pretrial release.
C. Cost Savings
One of the recurrent themes of OR proponents is that OR release
can save government expenditures by reducing jail populations. The
many defendants who cannot afford bail5" can be released rather than
remain incarcerated at taxpayer expense.60 To study the validity of
this proposition, the San Francisco Committee on Crime and the Los
Angeles County Superior Court each examined the impact of OR upon
jail operating expenses. Both approached the problem in the same
manner. The figures for the number of days defendants were free
on OR as opposed to the number of days they would otherwise have
been detained at government expense were translated into reductions in
jail costs. For example, the San Francisco's Sheriff's Office indicated
that the cost of jailing one person per day in San Francisco was $4.29
for 1969-1970. This figure may be low since the 1968-1969 state-wide
estimate was $6.44 per inmate per day.61 Today the figure for San
Francisco is between $8 and $9 per inmate per day.62 In any event, an
average of 425 defendants were free on OR release each day of 1969.
If these 425 defendants had been incarcerated rather than released on
OR, then even at a custody cost of $4.29 per man per day, the expense of
56. Statistics for this period indicate that out of 369 persons released on OR, 10
failed to appear. Tulare County Honor Release Program, Report and Evaluation of
the Honor Release Program, Dec. 1, 1971-May 31, 1972.
57. Statistics from January 1973 through June 1973 indicate that out of 1,243 de-
fendants released on OR, 44 failed to appear. Alameda County Pre-trial Release Unit,
Progress Report, Aug. 1, 1973. A sample of 600 cases processed by the unit indicated
that 21 failed to appear. Letter from Byron E. Ellsworth, Supervising Probation Offi-
cer, San Diego County Probation Department Bail Project, to the Pacific Law Journal,
Aug. 7, 1973.
58. Figures from the Sheriff's Department OR Unit and the Court OR Unit show
that for the first six months of 1973, 1,659 persons were released on OR, of which
28 failed to appear. Memorandum from Richard L. Kehoe, Administrative Analyst,
to Robert A. Covington, County Administrative Officer, San Bernardino County, July
10, 1973, on file in the offices of the Pacific Law Journal. Figures from November
1970 through April 1971 indicate that out of 173 persons released on OR, 5 failed
to appear. Berkeley OR Project Statistics as of May 1, 1971.
59. See text accompanying notes 18-25 supra.
60. Clarence E. Williams, supra note 18.
61. BAnL AND O.R. RELEASE at 23-24.
62. Kenneth C. L. Babb, supra note 29.
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keeping them in a jail would have been $665,000 for the year. 3
It has been suggested that this method of calculation does not account
for the many defendants who would have posted bail had OR not been
available and thus exaggerates the cost savings. 64 The Committee on
Crime admits that it is difficult to ascertain how many defendants
free on OR would have been able to post bail. However, the bail
project staff estimates that the vast majority could not have afforded
bail. Judges and public defenders agree.65 Notwithstanding this sup-
position, the report made allowance for this additional variable. As-
suming that one half of the 425 defendants released on OR could not
have afforded bail, then at a custody cost of $4.29 per inmate per day,
OR still saved the city over $330,000 per year. 6 This analysis relates
to 1969 when the cost of operation for the OR Project was $84,000.67
Currently, the budget is $127,000.68 However, considering the in-
crease in custody cost and the higher arrest rates, the conclusion
reached in 1969 that the project "is a windfall to the taxpayer"69 ap-
pears valid today.
Similarly, the annual report of the Superior Court for Los Angeles
County, covering only felony releases, indicates that 2,954 defendants
released on OR during 1972 spent a total of 287,431 days free on
OR. Based upon approximate custody costs of $9 per inmate per day,
this figure represents a gross custody savings of $2,859,220. Deduct-
ing the $563,256 operating costs for the OR unit, the savings to Los
Angeles County are staggering. 70  Moreover, cumulative figures from
1965 through 1971 reveal a gross dollar savings of more than
$8,500,000 as a result of 9,700 OR releases. Such savings led one
official to comment that the "overall OR Program has been a marked
success." 7' The report did not make allowance for those defendants
who may have posted bail had OR not been available; however, even
assuming that some defendants could have posted bail, it seems unmis-
takably clear that OR release is reducing jail costs.
Unlike the San Francisco and Los Angeles studies, which focused
upon the post-release period, the Santa Clara Pre-trial Release Project
determined "jail time saved" by examining the differences in the
length of in-custody time prior to release, between a group of OR de-
63. BAIL AND O.R. RELEAsE at 24.
64. William F. Sandbach, supra note 38.
65. BAIL AND O.R. RELEASE at 24.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 25.
68. Kenneth C. L. Babb, supra note 29.
69. BAn. AND O.R. RELEASE at 25.
70. Superior Court Report, supra note 53.
71. Frank S. Zolin, supra note 54.
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fendants and a comparable group of defendants released prior to the
commencement of the OR project. Rather than focusing upon the
number of days a defendant is free on OR and translating that figure
into dollar savings, this approach considers the time period prior to
release and translates the time difference into dollar savings. 712  It was
found that the average time for release in 1970, prior to the com-
mencement of the project, was 1.30 days for misdemeanors and 6.70
days for felonies.73 In contrast, the average time for release with
the project was .10 and .48 days for misdemeanors and felonies, re-
spectively. This indicates that the savings in jail time per release with
OR was 1.20 days for misdemeanors and 6.22 days for felonies. The
estimated number of defendants released on OR by the project for
a twelve-month period totaled 5,500 charged with misdemeanors and
1,179 charged with felonies. This translates into 6,600 jail days saved
for misdemeanors and 7,333 for felonies-a combined total of
13,933.4 At the time of the report, the estimated cost per prisoner per
day in Santa Clara County was $9.63. These figures show a gross
custody savings of $134,175. 7 1 The 1972-1973 budget for the con-
tinued operation of the project, excluding initial program costs, was
$97,638. Assuming that the OR release rates and jail costs remained
relatively the same, the project estimated a savings to the county of
$36,537 during 1972-1973.76
To summarize, it appears that OR is a money saver in two respects.
First, as demonstrated by the Santa Clara project, it allows defendants
to be released more quickly, thereby reducing pre-release detention
time apparent in other forms of release. Secondly, as underscored by
the San Francisco and Los Angeles projects, there are tremendous post-
release savings since OR provides a means for defendants to be free
pending trial rather than detained at taxpayer's expense. 1
72. Santa Clara Report at 23-24.
73. This includes all types of release. Id. at 25.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id. at 27.
77. One shortcoming of these studies is the failure to distinguish between fixed
and variable detention costs. The former reflect those expenses which are present as
long as the jail is operating, while the latter represent those costs attributable to the
jail population. Of course, there is an overlap, but it is suggested that future studies
allow for this distinction so that figures for cost reduction attributable to OR release
will be more precise.
in addition, other factors which are undoubtedly present and would contribute to cost
savings have not been measured. These include welfare costs saved when men released
on OR are the sole source of family income. On OR, they can continue to support
families which might otherwise be forced to seek public assistance. The state also loses
tax revenue that inmates cannot pay because of time lost from work. It is estimated
that these two factors alone cost the taxpayers in Los Angeles County an additional
eight million dollars annually. L.A. Times, Apr. 12, 1973, §1, at 3, col. 3.
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THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
Information compiled by the Manhattan Bail Project and published
in 1963 confirmed a belief long held by criminal lawyers that there
exists a direct correlation between a defendant's pretrial status and
the disposition of his case. The project examined the cases of two
control groups-those detained and those released prior to trial-and
discovered that 59 percent of those released were eventually found
not guilty, as compared with only 23 percent of those detained. More-
over, of those convicted from both groups, only 21 percent who were
released were sentenced to prison, whereas 96 percent of those de-
tained received prison terms.7 8 This led the project to suggest that
a "defendant at liberty pending trial stands a better chance of not be-
ing convicted or, if convicted, of not receiveing a prison sentence. '7 9
In 1964, another New York study confirmed these findings, but sug-
gested that further research was needed 80 Yet it was not until a dec-
ade later that a study by the Legal Aid Society of New York City,
in conjunction with the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social
Research, systematically reexamined the problem.81 This study ex-
amined the outcome of 857 selected cases. A demographic portrait
showed the group of defendants to be mostly young, unmarried, poor,
and unemployed, with a history of prior arrests.82 Most had been
charged with serious crimes.8 3 In some cases the defendants were
detained pending trial, while in others the defendants were released.
The Society's research focused upon the factors of each case which
might be expected to influence its outcome. These included the
weight of the evidence, seriousness of the charge, and amount of bail,
as well as the defendant's prior record, community ties, and employ-
ment history. The purpose was to isolate each factor to determine
the independent impact of pretrial detention upon the disposition of
each case. 4
The procedure used to isolate each factor was similar. For
example, to measure the influence of the weight of the evidence, the
study first looked to whether a confession had been made by the de-
fendant. It was determined that a confession indicated a stronger case
against the accused.8 1 The society compared the case dispositions be-
78. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, supra note 14, at 87.
79. Id. at 86.
80. Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 641, 643
(1964).
81. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4.
82. Id. at 8-9.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 16.
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tween those who had confessed and those who had not. This com-
parison would indicate whether the weight of evidence against the ac-
cused affected the outcome of his case. The study next examined the
disposition of the confession and nonconfession cases in terms of whether
the defendants within each group had been released or detained prior
to trial. This would indicate whether the independent fact of pretrial
detention affected the outcome. The results were revealing.
In comparing the case dispositions for those who had confessed and
those who had not, very little difference was found. For example,
30 percent of those who confessed were cleared of all charges against
them as compared with 31 percent of those who made no confession.8A
Of those convicted from both groups, 27 percent who confessed avoided
prison altogether while 22 percent of the nonconfession group could
make that claim. Finally, 14 percent of the confession group received
long sentences.87  The nonconfession group exhibited an identical per-
centage.88 These figures suggest that there is "little apparent relation-
ship between whether or not a person confessed and the outcome of
his case . "8. 0
On the other hand, considering the pretrial detention status, the
eventual outcome of the various cases reveals a great disparity between
the two groups. From the confession group, 47 percent of those re-
leased pending trial were cleared of all charges as compared with only
20 percent of those detained. Of those convicted, 38 percent of the
releasees avoided prison while only 19 percent of the detainees had
similar success. Moreover, only 3 percent of the releasees were given
long sentences in contrast to 21 percent of the detainees. The results
from the nonconfession group were similar. Fifty-three percent of
those released were cleared of all charges, while only 20 percent of those
detained were so cleared. Of those convicted, 31 percent of the re-
leasees were able to avoid imprisonment as opposed to only 18 percent
of the detainees. Finally, only 2 percent of the releasees were given
long sentences while 20 percent of those detained received long terms.00
These findings appear to indicate that insofars the presence or ab-
sence of a confession is concerned, it is not the weight of the evidence,
but rather the fact of pretrial detention alone which most influences
the outcome of the case. Using a similar procedure for each factor
86. The study did not indicate which, if any, confessions were found to be inad-
missible.
87. A long sentence was defined as any sentence of more than ninety days.
Plaintiff's Memorandum at 12.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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previously mentioned, 91 the disparity in the outcome was invariably
traced to the pretrial status of the accused. While isolating the factor
of prior criminal record, it was found that first offenders who are de-
tained receive prison sentences 50 percent of the time. Incredibly,
recidivists with more than ten prior arrests, but who are released pend-
ing trial, receive prison sentences only 28 percent of the time.92
Moreover, even a combination of these factors in the defendant's back-
ground did not explain the disparity in outcome between those de-
tained and those released prior to trial.93
In short, the Society found that those released had one chance in
two of being convicted, while four out of five detainees were convicted
Furthermore, 33 percent of those released who were found guilty re-
ceived prison terms as compared with 75 percent of those detained.
In addition, the confinement of detainees not only occurred more fre-
quently, but was of greater duration.94 According to the study,
[t]he inescapable conclusion is that the fact of detention itself
causes those detained to be convicted far more often and sen-
tenced much more severely than those who are released. Thus,
the present bail system creates two classes of accused distinguished
by their wealth or lack of it: those who are released . . . and
those who are detained in lieu of bail .... 95
It is nearly impossible to determine with any certainty the precise
cause of the disparity in case disposition between detainees and re-
leasees. However, several theories have been advanced which may
help to explain this disparity. Initially, a jailed defendant is restricted
in assisting in the preparation of his defense. He cannot help seek
out evidence and witnesses which may be vital to his case. He is
allowed to see his attorney only at certain times, usually within the
confines of the jail. Moreover, he cannot make amends with com-
plainants which may result in charges being dropped, whereas a re-
leased defendant may be able to do so.96 Secondly, there are
pressures upon a detained defendant to plead guilty that may not
be present for one released on bail. A bailed defendant will attempt
to delay his case as long as possible since he may be offered a better deal
by the prosecutor. The backlog of court cases makes the prosecution
anxious to dispose of the oldest cases. Also, the longer the delay, the
greater the chance that witnesses may move, lose interest in the case,
or even die. Furthermore, public interest in the case may decline.
91. Id. at 13-27.
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id. at 28.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 29.
96. RANsom at 41.
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Although present, these factors are not as important to a defendant
faced with the possibility of lengthy pretrial detention. To this de-
fendant detention means not only a loss of freedom, but also a separa-
tion from his family and, potentially, the loss of his job. These con-
cerns, plus the disadvantage he experiences in the preparation of his
defense, often lead a detainee to believe that the best disposition he
can expect is a light sentence from a negotiated plea.97 Additionally,
there is the psychological prejudice in the minds of the court and the
jury when a detainee is escorted into court by a guard after spending
time in jail. This is in sharp contrast to the releasee "who casually
enters the courtroom, well-groomed, and accompanied by his family
and attorney."98 Also, there may be a tendency upon the part of the
judge to be more lenient with a bailed defendant who has demon-
strated his trustworthiness by appearing in court as requested. The
detainee is unable to demonstrate his reliability. It has even been
suggested that courts may subconsciously be more inclined to find a
detainee guilty as a method of justifying his pretrial incarceration. Al-
though difficult to prove, these factors taken together may help to ex-
plain why defendants released prior to trial receive better dispositions
than those who are detained.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE CALIFORNIA OR RELEASE STATUTES
It has been suggested that if a study on the impact of pretrial deten-
tion were conducted state-wide in California, it would reveal results
substantially similar to those in New York City, as illustrated by the
studies previously discussed.99 In Oakland, a city-wide study con-
firmed this prediction, at least on a local level. 00 Similar results, if
demonstrated on a state-wide level, would raise grave implications as
to the constitutionality of California's OR release statutes.' 0 '
Under California Penal Code Section 1318, a defendant may be
released upon his own recognizance only upon a showing of good
cause,10 2 which is to say that the accused carries the burden of demon-
97. BAIL AND O.R. RELEAsE at 12-13.
98. RANsom at 42.
99. Clarence E. Williams, supra note 18.
100. FoRD FOUNDATION AND CouNTY OF ALAMEDA, PRE-TRIAL RELEASE IN OAK-
LAND, CALnoRaiA (1967), cited in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement at 8,
Kawaichi v. Madigan, No. 432674 (Sup. Ct., Alameda Co., Dec. 7, 1973).
101. CAL. PEN. CODE §1318 etseq.
102. Upon good cause being shown, any court or magistrate who could re-
lease a defendant from custody upon his giving bail may release such defend-
ant on his own recognizance if it appears to such court or magistrate that
such defendant will surrender himself to custody as agreed, by following the
provisions of this article.
CAL. PEN. CODE, §1318.
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strating to the court why he should be so released.' Moreover, even
if he demonstrates good cause, the court has absolute discretion under
Penal Code Section 1318.2 to deny such release without stating its
reasons.104  The application of these provisions has an adverse effect
only upon indigent defendants unable to post bail. According to the
San Francisco Committee on Crime, many judges deny OR even when
a defendant qualifies under the point system. This is attributed to
the unfavorable attitude of some judges towards OR. The committee
believes, "ITjhis most crucial stage of the criminal justice process-
a stage which in practice determines guilt or innocence for many de-
fendants-is capricious and arbitrary. OR release . . . too often de-
pends on men, not law."'1 5  Defendants with money, having been
denied OR release pursuant to the above penal code sections, can pur-
chase their freedom by posting bail. Only those too poor to post bail
are incarcerated pending trial. In effect, only indigents are subjected
to the adverse effects of pretrial detention demonstrated by the New
York study. The result is that two classes of defendants are deline-
ated-those detained prior to trial and those released-with wealth as
the determining factor.
The California Supreme Court, following the lead of the United
States Supreme Court, has applied a two-level test in reviewing legisla-
tive classifications under the equal protection clauses of the United
States and California Constitutions. In the realm of economic regula-
tion, the court generally exercises restraint by presuming the constitu-
tional validity of the legislation and requiring only that classifications
delineated by the statute bear some "rational relationship to a . . .
legitimate state purpose."'106 However, in cases involving suspect
classifications or touching on fundamental interests, the courts have
adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the legis-
lative classifications to strict judicial scrutiny. Under this standard, the
"state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compel-
ling state interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn
by the law are necessary to further its purpose."'0 7 To be necessary,
the distinction must be the least burdensome alternative possible to pro-
103. Interview with Joe Taylor, Deputy District Attorney, Sacramento County,
Sacramento, Calif., Dec. 11, 1973.
104. "The powers granted to a court or magistrate by this article are purely dis-
cretionary and permissive. This article does not give any defendant the right to be
released on his own recognizance." CAL. PEN. CODE §1318.2.
105. BAn. AND O.R. RELEASE at 27-28.
106. Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 784, 471 P.2d 487, 500, 87 Cal. Rptr.
839, 852 (1970).
107. Id. at 785, 471 P.2d at 500-01, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53; see also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802,
807 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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mote the compelling state interest. 1 8
California has recognized that any classification independently based
upon wealth is highly suspect and demands strict judicial scrutiny.'10
Furthermore, Griffin v. Illinois 0 and its progeny"1 make it clear
that where liberty is at stake a state may not grant even a nonconsti-
tutional statutory right to one person and deny it to another because
of poverty. 12 Although California has recognized a qualified constitu-
tional right to be released on bail,1 3 no such right is recognized for
OR release. OR release is granted statutorily; thus it is incumbent
upon the courts to see that this statutory right is not applied in a dis-
criminatory manner.
Since only indigent defendants are adversely affected by the appli-
cation of these statutes, their validity become suspect, making it essen-
tial that the state demonstrate not only a compelling interest in the
classification, but also that the distinctions between rich and poor are
the least burdensome means for furthering that interest. It is recog-
nized that the only legitimate state purpose in placing restrictions upon
a defendant's pretrial liberty is to assure his attendance in court when
his presence is required.1  If this is the only legitimate purpose, it
must also be the only compelling state interest.11 5 Therefore, prior
to denying OR release, the state must bear the burden of proving why
a defendant so released is likely not to appear in court."10 More-
over, the court should also be required to state for the record its
reasons for denial." 7  This would provide the defendant with a record
for appeal. Under present law, the state is required to do neither.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a person
should not be imprisoned solely for his lack of wealth."18 California
adheres to this view. In In re Antazo" 9 the petitioner and his code-
fendant were both convicted of arson. The judge imposed a three-
year suspended sentence for each defendant and ordered that they
108. Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 507 P.2d 1345, 1350, 107 Cal. Rptr.
137, 142 (1973).
109. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 610 (1971).
110. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
111. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477(1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487 (1963); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
112. Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681, 683-84 (10th Cir. 1969).
113. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §6.
114. See note 40 supra.
115. Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 100, at 10-11.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); see also, United States v. Gaines, 449
F.2d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 1971).
119. 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
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be released on the condition that each pay a fine. In lieu of payment,
each defendant would serve one day in jail for every ten dollars un-
paid. Unlike his codefendant who was released, the petitioner was
unable to afford the fine and was sent to jail. The California Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the imprisonment of a convicted
indigent for nonpayment of a fine was unnecessary to promote a com-
pelling state interest. Moreover, the court recognized that numerous
alternatives were available. 2 '
This case is applicable to the statutory provisions for OR release.
In Antazo the court objected to the petitioner's imprisonment for the
involuntary nonpayment of a fine. Yet a similar situation arises every
time an indigent is denied OR. That defendant becomes imprisoned
for the involuntary nonpayment of bail. Moreover, the holding in Ant-
azo applied to a convicted defendant, whereas indigents denied OR
under Penal Code Sections 1318 and 1318.2 have yet to be tried and
are presumed innocent. In short, there is "no real distinction between
pretrial and post-sentence detention."' 21  If there is no compelling
state interest in denying post-trial liberty for involuntary nonpayment
of a fine, then there can be no compelling state interest in denying
pretrial liberty for involuntary nonpayment of bail. This is not to say
that all indigents should automatically be released on OR. The state
has a justifiable interest in assuring the presence of the accused in
court, and if it demonstrates that a defendant is likely not to comply
with a promise to appear, OR can be justifiably denied. However,
to deny OR without requiring the state to show cause creates a situa-
tion where only indigent defendants are subject to the whims of the
state, while others may obtain their release by bail.
It may be argued that since OR is not a statutory right but merely
a privilege, the state may deny it without showing a compelling inter-
est. In other words, the classification, rather than denying rights to
indigents, merely extends the right of pretrial release to those defen-
dants who demonstrate good cause. Using this approach, the court
would apply the traditional test and uphold the legislative classifica-
tions as long as a rational basis existed. This reasoning was applied in
McDonald v. Board of Election.122  In that case, an Illinois statute
granted the right to receive absentee ballots to four specified groups.
The statute was attacked on equal protection grounds by inmates await-
ing trial in a county jail who were not encompassed by the statute. The
inmates were qualified voters, but were unable to get to the polls since
120. Id. at 115-16, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
121. Parker v. Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400, 1402 (E.D. N.C. 1971).
122. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
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they were either charged with nonbailable offenses or were unable to
afford bail. In upholding the statute, the Court decided that the statu-
tory provisions were not drawn on the basis of race or wealth. More-
over, there was nothing to indicate that Illinois had prevented the inmates
from exercising their fundamental right to vote. The Court pointed out
that the state could conceivably furnish the jails with special polling
booths or even provide guarded transportation to the polls themselves.
The Court reasoned that Illinois was not denying the right to vote to the
inmates but was extending the right to receive absentee ballots to spec-
ified groups. Since there was no suspect classification nor abridge-
ment of a fundamental right, the Court upheld the classification by
applying the traditional test.
It is curious that the Court decided that there was neither classification
based on wealth nor abridgement of a fundamental right when the
effect of the statute was to deny, at least in part, the right to vote
to those too poor to post bail. However, McDonald can be distin-
guished from the application of California Penal Code Sections 1318
and 1318.2. In McDonald, the statute was aimed at extending the
right to absentee ballots to groups separate and apart from the inmates.
The appellants did not lose the right to vote due to the statute, but
by the fact of their incarceration. However, the above Penal Code
provisions are aimed exclusively at those detained prior to trial. If
the court arbitrarily denies OR to one group of defendants, then only
those defendants within the group who possess the financial means
to post bail are released. The others are detained. The effect be-
comes a denial of pretrial liberty upon the basis of wealth, a suspect
classification that requires application of the stricter standard.
However, assuming for a moment that the rationale of McDonald
applies, it is questionable whether Sections 1318 and 1318.2 can with-
stand judicial scrutiny under the more liberal test which requires a
rational relationship between the classification and the purpose for the
legislation. 12 3 As stated, the only legitimate state purposes for deny-
ing pretrial liberty is to assure that the accused appears in court.12
Yet, under these provisions the state may deny OR release without
any showing that the defendant is likely not to appear if released.
Without such a showing, it is impossible to say that the classification
between releasees and detainees under Sections 1318 and 1318.2 ra-
tionally relates to the only recognized state purpose. In short,
123. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 861, 507 P.2d 212, 216, 106 Cal. Rptr.
388, 392 (1973).
124. See note 40 supra.
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it is more consistent with our accusatorial system and the presump-
tion of innocence that any denial of pretrial liberty should be al-
lowed only when the state . . . provides a sufficient justification
for it. To require less would produce the ironic result that a per-
son could be imprisoned after trial only if the state showed the
need for incarceration by demonstrating beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was guilty, while a person could be imprisoned be-
fore trial without any showing by the state at all!12 5
To satisfy the constitutional mandate of equal protection, the state,
prior to the denial of OR, should be required to show good cause why
a defendant is likely not to appear in court if released. A denial of
pretrial release would then be justified as necessary to promote the
compelling state interest of assuring the accused's presence. The
court must retain discretion in the matter of OR, but the burden of
proof should be upon the state rather than the defendant. Moreover,
the judge should be required to state for the record his reasons for
denying OR. This would provide a record should the defendant de-
sire to appeal.
SUGGESTED LEGISLATION
In light of the successful results of current OR projects in California,
Assemblyman Willie Brown, Chairman of the Assembly Committee
on Ways and Means of the California State Legislature, is studying
recommendations for future legislation.1 26  These recommendations,
in addition to correcting the inequities under present law, suggest the
creation of a state-wide OR project along the following guidelines:
1. Establishment of a steering committee composed of repre-
sentatives of the criminal justice system to direct the implementa-
tion of the project. The committee would include judges, prose-
cutors, and defense attorneys, as well as representatives from law
enforcement agencies and current OR projects. The committee
would establish uniform guidelines for a state-wide OR project.
These guidelines would include, among other things, criteria for
release, qualifications for staff members, and project evaluation
procedures.
2. Requirement that each pretrial release project submit to
the court reports on each defendant within its jurisdiction who
consents to be interviewed for possible release on OR.
3. Establishment of a mandatory procedure whereby the judge
or magistrate decides if the defendant qualifies for OR based upon
125. Plaintiff's Motion, supra note 100, at 10.
126. Clarence E. Williams, supra note 18.
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all information available, including, but not limited to, the report
submitted by the OR staff.
4. Requirement that the state show cause why a defendant
should not be released on OR. Only if the state meets that burden
should release be denied. Also, the judge or magistrate would
be required to state for the record his reasons for denying OR.
5. Provision that each defendant be allowed one appeal as a
matter of right for a denial of OR.
6. Provision for an evaluative study to be made three years
after the commencement of the project to determine its progress
based upon the objectives established by the committee. The
committee would be required to report its findings to the legislature.
7. Requirement that each project maintain careful records of
its progress in compliance with guidelines established by the com-
mittee.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that OR has proven itself as a viable alterna-
tive to the monetary bail system. 127  Based upon information thus far
compiled, it appears that OR can save tax revenue and operate as well
as or more effectively than bail in assuring the presence of the accused
in court. More information is needed in the area of recidivism rates
for defendants released on bail and OR. However, the Santa Clara
study suggests that the rates for both groups are comparable.
The greatest appeal of OR is the sense of fairness it introduces into
the criminal justice system. It affords all defendants the same oppor-
tunity to be released prior to trial without regard to wealth. Moreover,
the recent New York study demonstrates the devastating impact of pre-
trial detention upon the disposition of one's case. It appears that this
impact can be minimized by OR.
The major criticism of OR is that it may set free defendants who
pose a threat to the community. Yet the same risk exists when a per-
son is released on bail. As indicated earlier, the court has held it to
be an abuse of discretion to prevent pretrial release by manipulating
the bail-setting process for the purpose of protecting the public.128
Likewise, it should be an abuse of the court's discretion to deny OR
for the same reason. Preventive detention should be an entirely dif-
127. Id.
128. Id.
128. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 348, 508 P.2d 721, 723, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401,
403 (1973); see note 40 supra.
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ferent consideration from OR release. If the court is prepared to deny
pretrial liberty for the purpose of protecting the community, it should
do so without regard to the defendant's financial status. The court
should not be able to do to indigents what it is not permitted to do
to those able to afford bail. In sum, if the only legitimate purpose
for denying bail is the fact that the defendant will not appear in court,
then that must be the only legitimate purpose for denying OR. Other-
wise, the distinction between defendants rests solely upon the basis of
wealth and is unjustifiable. The initiation of a state-wide OR project
along the lines suggested would help to alleviate the inequities pres-
ent in the bail system.
Mark V. Pettine
